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Chapter 5 PRINCIPLES AND REALITIES The Principles of Peace and its StrategyIf war is justified in the situations
described above, a question arises as to whether Muslims are obligated to fight in these
situations, no matter what the circumstances are, or whether it is simply a matter of
permissibility or choices, and hence up to the Muslim community to exercise its right to
declare war in such situations? To answer this question we need to differentiate between
the principle of jihad as a permanent obligation incumbent upon Muslims, and the method of
jihad which is to be determined after assessing the prevailing conditions of the moment,
and selecting the most appropriate method of jihad to effectively deal with these
conditions. In other words, while the Muslim Ummah is obliged to uphold the principle of
jihad and satisfy its requirements, the method of honoring this principle is a question of
strategy. Eliminating oppression and protecting human life, defending Muslim sovereignty
and upholding the Islamic law, are objectives of the Islamic Ummah. The principle of jihad
obligates the Muslims to maintain and achieve these objectives. The best way to achieve
these objectives, and most appropriate method of upholding the principle of jihad is,
however, a question of leadership and strategy. Throughout the Makkan period, the Muslims
maintained a pacifist approach in dealing with their adversaries, despite the physical
abuse and mental anguishes inflicted upon them by Quraysh. For pacifism was then the best
method to effectively achieve Muslim objectives.60 Some might argue that Muslims did not
resort to violence during the Makkan period because they were not permitted to fight at
that time-an argument easily overturned when we realize that the absence of the principle
of self-defense during the Makkan period was a temporary suspension of the principle's
application, rather than its nullification or rejection. Certainly, the Qur'an
unequivocally states that the principle of self-defense and military deference is an
essential element of social life and a fundamental principle around which human
civilization has evolved
Thus, it is up to the Muslim leadership
to assess the situation and weigh the circumstances as well as the capacity of the Muslim
community before deciding the appropriate type of jihad. At one stage, Muslims may find
that jihad, through persuasion or peaceful resistance, is the best and most effective
method to achieve just peace, as was the case during the Makkan period. At another stage,
fortification and defensive tactics may be the best way to achieve these objectives, as
was the case of the Battle of al Khandaq. At yet a third stage, the Muslim leadership may
decide that all-out war is the most appropriate measure to bring about just peace, as was
the case during the war against the Arab apostates. The selection of the method of jihad,
however, is not an arbitrary decision, but one that takes into account the general
conditions of both the Muslim community and its adversaries, including the military
balance between the Muslims and their enemies and the morale of the Muslim army. The
Qur'an circumscribed the Muslim ability to militarily confront its adversaries by two
ratios (ten-to-one and two-to-one) that sets the upper and lower limits of the Muslim
forces in terms of their manpower.
These verses vividly state that given
favorable conditions and high morale, Muslims could, by virtue of their faith, win against
odds of ten to one. But when their organization and equipment are weak, and their morale
falls short of the optimal situation, they are obligated to tackle no more than odds of
two to one. The first situation was illustrated at the Battle of Badr where the Muslim
army crushed a force threefold bigger, while the second situation is demonstratable in the
Battle of al Khandaq, when Muslims, confronted with a force manifold stronger than their
own, elected to fortify in their city by digging a ditch around Madinah, and thus avoided
military confrontation with their enemies.61 Conclusion Evidently, the classical doctrine of war and peace has not been
predicated on a comprehensive theory. The doctrine describes the factual conditions that
historically prevailed between the Islamic state during the 'Abbasid and Byzantium, era,
and thus, renders rules which respond to specific historical needs. The lack of a
comprehensive theory of war and peace has led further to major errors in perceiving the
role of war and the real objectives of the Islamic state vis-a-vis non-Muslim communities.
The classical doctrine mistakenly
perceives war as the instrument of the Islamic state to expand the Muslim territories and
dominate non-Muslim states. As it has shown in this paper, the aim of war is to assure
justice and abolish oppression and tyranny. The expansion of Islam is to be achieved
through persuasion and the use of peaceful means, not by force and compulsion. Only when
the peaceful effort is frustrated, is the Islamic state justified in resorting to war. Yet
peace in Islam does not mean the absence of war, because Islam considers that real peace
can only be attained when justice prevails. Islam, therefore, justifies war against
regimes that prevent people from choosing their ideas or practicing their beliefs. Finally, although this discussion has been confined to the conception of war and peace and issues concerning the initiation of war, it can also be extended to questions concerning the prosecution of war and the conduct of peace – e.g., treaties, prisoners of war, spoils of war, and so forth. Many of the rules pertaining to these issues are predicated on customs, traditions, or conceptions peculiar to the historical period in which these rules were first articulated, and have thus a historically limited application. |
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| Copyright © 2001 Louay Safi |